﻿ 基于影子价格的排污权定价机制实证研究 Empirical Study on the Pricing Mechanism of Emission Rights Based on Shadow Price

Sustainable Development
Vol.07 No.04(2017), Article ID:22283,7 pages
10.12677/SD.2017.74020

Empirical Study on the Pricing Mechanism of Emission Rights Based on Shadow Price

Shanshan Ding, Jindong Duan

College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing Jiangsu

Received: Sep. 25th, 2017; accepted: Oct. 9th, 2017; published: Oct. 12th, 2017

ABSTRACT

Due to the increasingly serious environmental pollution and global environmental governance and protection have become hot topic, as emissions trading to achieve an important means to promote the dual goals of economic development and protection of the ecological environment, in the main developed country environment management is playing a more and more important role. How to reasonable pricing has been the blowdown right trade key factor. This paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the initial allocation of emission rights way, through the establishment of shadow price model and simulation of initial emission permits and secondary pricing mechanism, obtained initial allocation of emission rights price and sewage in secondary trading market equilibrium price can provide a reference role for the government price sell emission rights and determine the secondary market emissions trading price.

1. 引言

2. 针对排污权初始分配方式的分析

2.1. 排污权初始分配方式

2.2. 初始分配方式的利弊

2.3. 我国排污权交易初次尝试限额交易

3. 标价出售的排污权定价模型的构建

3.1. 排污权初次定价模型

3.1.1. 基本假设

3.1.2. 排污权初始定价模型的分析

$\text{Max}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{C}_{总}=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\sum }}\left(C\ast {B}_{i}\right)=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\sum }}\left(C\ast x\ast {b}_{i}\right)$ (1)

$\text{s}\text{.t}\text{.}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\sum }}{b}_{i}\le {A}_{总}$

$D=\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\sum }}\left(C\ast x\ast {b}_{i}\right)+\lambda ×\left({A}_{总}-\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\sum }}{b}_{i}\right)$ (2)

$\text{s}\text{.t}\text{.}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\underset{i=1}{\overset{n}{\sum }}{b}_{i}\le {A}_{总}$

3.2. 排污权二次交易定价模型

3.2.1. 基本假设

3.2.2. 排污权二次定价模型分析

$\text{Min}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}I=p×\left({b}_{i}-{b}_{i}^{0}-{a}_{i}\right)+C×x×{a}_{i}+{f}_{i}\left({b}_{i}^{0}\right)+{H}_{i}\left({g}_{i}\right)+{I}_{i}\left({B}_{i}\right)$ (3)

$\begin{array}{l}\partial {f}_{i}\left({b}_{i}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+\partial {H}_{i}\left({g}_{i}\right)/\partial {g}_{i}\ast \partial {g}_{i}/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+x\ast \partial {I}_{i}\left({B}_{i}\right)/\partial {b}_{i}\ast \partial {b}_{i}/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+\left(C\ast x\right)\ast \partial {a}_{i}/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}-p\ge 0\\ {\gamma }^{\ast }\ast \left[\partial {f}_{i}\left({b}_{i}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+\partial {H}_{i}\left({g}_{i}\right)/\partial {g}_{i}\ast \partial {g}_{i}/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+\partial {I}_{i}\left({B}_{i}\right)/\partial {B}_{i}\ast \partial {B}_{i}/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+\left(C\ast x\right)\ast \partial {a}_{i}/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}-p\right]=0\\ {b}_{i}^{0}\ge 0\end{array}$ (4)

$\partial {f}_{i}\left({b}_{i}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+x\ast \partial {I}_{i}\left({B}_{i}\right)/\partial {B}_{i}-C\ast x=p+\partial {H}_{i}\left({g}_{i}\right)/\partial {g}_{i}$ (5)

$\partial {f}_{i}\left({b}_{i}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{i}^{0}+x\ast \partial {I}_{i}\left({B}_{i}\right)/\partial {B}_{i}-C\ast x=p-\partial {H}_{i}\left({g}_{i}\right)/\partial {g}_{i}$ (6)

$\partial {f}_{1}\left({b}_{1}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{1}^{0}+x\ast \partial {I}_{1}\left({B}_{1}\right)/\partial {B}_{1}-C\ast x=p+\partial {H}_{1}\left({g}_{1}\right)/\partial {g}_{1}$ (7)

$\partial {f}_{2}\left({b}_{2}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{2}^{0}+x\ast \partial {I}_{2}\left({B}_{2}\right)/\partial {B}_{2}-C\ast x=p$ (8)

$P=1/2\left[\partial {f}_{1}\left({b}_{1}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{1}^{0}+\partial {f}_{2}\left({b}_{2}^{0}\right)/\partial {b}_{2}^{0}+x\ast \left[\partial {I}_{1}\left({B}_{1}\right)/\partial {B}_{1}+\partial {I}_{2}\left({B}_{2}\right)/\partial {B}_{2}\right]\right]$ (9)

4. 要素优化配置对排污权定价模型重要性

4.1. 合法的排污权是影子价格发挥作用的前提

4.2. 环境政策的有效性制约着影子价格的检测效应

4.3. 排污权市场处于何种状态决定价格是否真实

4.4. 企业参与度反映了排污权定价的合理性

4.5. 环境信息系统影响排污权定价的精确性

5. 结束语

Empirical Study on the Pricing Mechanism of Emission Rights Based on Shadow Price[J]. 可持续发展, 2017, 07(04): 157-163. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/SD.2017.74020

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16. NOTES



1库兹涅茨曲线是上世纪50年代诺贝尔奖获得者、经济学家库兹涅茨用来分析人均收入水平与分配公平程度之间关系的一种学说。研究表明，收入不均现象随着经济增长先升后降，呈现倒U型曲线关系。当一个国家经济发展水平较低的时候，环境污染的程度较轻，但是随着人均收入的增加，环境污染由低趋高，环境恶化程度随经济的增长而加剧；当经济发展达到一定水平后，也就是说，到达某个临界点或称“拐点”以后，随着人均收入的进一步增加，环境污染又由高趋低，其环境污染的程度逐渐减缓，环境质量逐渐得到改善，这种现象被称为环境库兹涅茨曲线。